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Abstrak
Studi ini membahas tentang pengungsi yang tinggal bertahun-tahun di Indonesia sebagai negara transit. Mereka dihadapkan pada kenyataan 
bahwa kesempatan untuk ditempatkan di negara ketiga semakin kecil, sementara untuk kembali pulang ke negara masing-masing hanya akan 
membahayakan nasib mereka. Indonesia bukan negara yang meratifikasi Konvensi Pengungsi tahun 1951 yang menetapkan kewajiban bagi 
negara yang meratifikasinya untuk membantu asimilasi pengungsi. Namun begitu, Indonesia membuka pintunya untuk para pengungsi atas 
dasar solidaritas kemanusiaan dan karena fakta bahwa ada pengakuan hak seseorang untuk mencari suaka di negara lain dan prinsip 
non-refoulement di dalam kerangka hukum hak asasi manusia Indonesia. Situasinya menjadi lebih problematik ketika jumlah pengungsi yang 
masuk ke Indonesia terus bertambah tetapi proses pemukiman mereka di negara ketiga semakin tidak pasti, sementara kebijakan pengungsi 
yang komprehensif untuk membantu pengungsi tidak memadai. Dengan melihat penanganan pengungsi di Pekanbaru di bawah Peraturan 
Presiden Nomor 125 tahun 2016, studi ini menyarankan pemerintah Indonesia seharusnya mempertimbangkan program integrasi lokal sebagai 
salah satu solusi terhadap keberadaan protracted refugees ini.
Kata kunci: pengungsi, pengungsi menahun, integrasi pengungsi, negara transit.
INTRODUCTION
   Indonesia has become a well-known transit country 
among refugees wanting to reach third countries like 
Australia (Hugo, Tan, & Napitupulu, 2017). It is not an 
easy ordeal for these refugees as they have to wait, 
sometimes for so many years, before a third country 
welcomes them. The number of refugees currently staying 
Abstract
This study discusses refugees who have been stranded in Indonesia as a transit country. These protracted refugees have to deal with a reality 
that the chance of getting resettlement in a third country has become slim, and the option of returning to their origin country will only 
jeopardize their lives. Indonesia is not a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention that lays a responsibility to assimilate refugees in the 
resettlement countries. Indonesia, however, has opened its door for refugees based on humanity’s solidarity and the fact that Indonesia’s legal 
framework on human rights acknowledges the right to seek asylum in other countries and abides by the non-refoulment principle. The situation 
has become problematic when the number of refugees coming to Indonesia has continued to increase, but Indonesia does not have a 
comprehensive refugee policy to support them. By looking at the case of refugee management in Pekanbaru under the President Regulation 
No. 125 of 2016, we suggest that Indonesia consider the local integration option a viable solution to the protracted refugee situations in 
Indonesia.
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in Indonesia is relatively small than those seeking refuge 
in a country like Bangladesh or Malaysia (UNHCR 
Indonesia, 2020). However, Indonesia still needs a 
solution for these stranded refugees as problems might 
arise from their increasing numbers, and the government 
cannot just ignore them or deport them back to their 
country. In this paper, we argue that the government 
should consider the local integration option for 
protracted refugees, who, according to United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have lived 
for more than five years in the country they first took 
refuge. By granting them their right to work, for example, 
we can help reduce their dependencies on donors’ 
assistance and empower them as human beings.
     Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia 
No. 125 of 2016 (PP No. 125 Tahun 2016) concerning 
Handling of Refugees from Abroad; the latest regulation 
that the Indonesian government has produced to manage 
refugees, has so far provided helps in accepting asylum 
seekers, accommodating, and providing them with 
security. The refugees are bound to rules limiting their 
socio-economic mobilities and constant monitoring from 
the immigration service department and the local 
government. By studying the implementation of PP No. 
125 Tahun 2016 and the experiences of refugees living in 
Pekanbaru, where some have long awaiting years, we 
suggest that the Indonesian government not neglect the 
refugee problems. The excuse that Indonesia is not a 
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and thus 
Indonesia is not bound to the responsibility to assimilate 
the refugees, only contradicts the mandate  of the 1945 
Constitution for Indonesia to “participate toward the 
establishment of a world order based on freedom, 
perpetual peace and social justice.” It also repudiates the 
country’s endorsement of the economic, social and 
cultural rights stipulated under the ratification of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
      During the field study, we interviewed 28 respondents 
from the government officials responsible for managing 
the refugees (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik Kota 
Pekanbaru and Rumah Detensi Imigrasi Pekanbaru), a 
member of local people’s representative council (DPRD 
Kota), community leaders and NGOs, UNHCR and 
IOM representatives and the refugees from Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Myanmar. Respondents were given open-ended 
questions. For the authorities, we looked at whether PP 
No. 125 Tahun 2016 has created differences in refugees’ 
management. We also asked about challenges that the 
local government has faced since local governments have 
been granted more active roles with the issuance of PP 
No. 125 Tahun 2016. In our interviews with the local 
community, we asked about their perception of refugees 
and whether they communicate with them. As for the 
refugees, we asked about their living experience in 
Pekanbaru and how they cope with their situation.
     The organization of this paper is as follows. The first 
part discusses the conceptual framework of refugee 
integration, how it originated, and how it is practiced. 
The next section discusses the dynamics of refugee 
protection in the context of Pekanbaru, the locus of the 
study. After laying out the foundation of our arguments 
in the first and second sections, we discuss why Indonesia 
should consider the local integration option. There have 
been a significant number of refugee studies in Indonesia 
(see Ali, Briskman, & Fiske, 2016; Brown, 2017; 
Missbach, Adiputera, & Prabandari, 2018; Triceseria, 
Zayda, & Prabaningtyas, 2015), yet, on the issue of 
protracted refugees, it is still underdeveloped. We hope 
this paper will contribute to the burgeoning field. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
     Three concepts lay the groundwork for this research. 
First, a transit country, defining as “a country that 
refugees and migrants pass through along the way to their 
preferred country of asylum—it may be located anywhere 
between the country of origin and the country of 
destination” (Kilibarda, 2017, p. 215). What we refer to 
as a transit country is Indonesia, which according to 
UNHCR’s report per July 2020, hosted 13,653 refugees 
from various countries from Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq 
to Myanmar (UNHCR Indonesia, 2020). Its geographical 
feature close to countries with refugee resettlement 
programs in their refugee policy like Australia and New 
Zealand has made Indonesia one of the preferable transit 
countries for refugees, especially those coming from the 
Middle East (Missbach & Sinanu, 2011). In Indonesia, 
these refugees reside in temporary accommodations 
scattered in several cities like Jakarta, Medan, Cisarua 
Bogor, Pekanbaru, and Makasar.
     The second concept is integration. It is important to 
note that ‘integration’ is an elusive concept that lacks 
clarity or a consensus on defining it. Nevertheless, despite 
this conceptual problem, UNHCR and academics of 
refugee studies frequently employ the term when they 
talk about refugee settlement. Another thing to point 
out, the word ‘integration’ does not appear in the 1951 
Refugee Convention; the legal text that becomes the basis 
for refugee protection applies the term ‘assimilate’ 
instead. Under Article 34, the Convention lays the 
responsibility of the host states to the refugees: “The 
Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the 
assimilation and naturalization of refugees” (UNHCR, 
2010). Some scholars use ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ 
synonymously (Kibreab, 1989), while others treat them 
differently. (Kuhlman, 1991, p. 6), for example, it points 
out that ‘assimilation’ implies altering migrants’ group 
identities almost to the point that they are “more or less 
indistinguishable from other members of their adopted 
society”. What integration should be, according to 
Kuhlman, is the condition where “the migrants maintain 
their own identity, yet become part of the host society to 
the extent that host population and refugees can live 
together in an acceptable way” (p. 6).
   Local integration, dubbed as one of  “the durable 
solutions” for refugees (UNHCR, n.d.), is a 
multidimensional concept. Integration can be a legal 
process where refugees can enjoy a “wider range of rights” 
(Crisp, 2004, p. 1) stated under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, such as freedom of movement, employment 
rights, or admission to the educational institution. This 
dimension can lead to the right to acquire permanent 
residence status, building a pathway for citizenship. The 
second feature of integration is related to economic 
empowerment. This integration element is by 
incorporating the refugees in economic activities; thus, 
they become independent and no longer dependant on 
aids from the government or humanitarian groups. The 
last aspect of integration is related to social bonding 
between the refugees and the locals. This dimension is 
instigated by “enabling refugees to live amongst or 
alongside the host population, without fear of systematic 
discrimination, intimidation or exploitation by the 
authorities or people of the asylum country” (Crisp, 
2004, pp. 1-2). Crisp differentiates between ‘local 
integration’ with ‘local settlement’, other terminologies 
often mixed with the first concept. While local 
integration implies a long-lasting effect on the refugees, 
local settlement serves as a temporary solution that does 
not include the plan for the refugees. As Crisp points out, 
the local settlement was a popular approach used by 
African countries in the 1960s-1980s to relocate refugees’ 
massive arrival to open land to live and sustain their lives 
by farming. As the host states recognized them as prima 
facie refugees, they did not process them and treat them 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
       The third concept is associated with the phenomenon 
where some refugees must undergo long waiting periods 
in the country they first seek asylum, an experience often 
equated with living in limbo. To put it simply, living in 
limbo means the agony of unable to return to their home 
country due to the high risk, and thus they are stranded 
in a host country reluctant to take them as permanent 
residents and impose limits on their mobility, while at the 
same time facing uncertainties of whether or not a third 
country will approve their application for resettlement 
(Crisp, 2002). UNHCR calls the circumstance where 
refugees have been stranded living in a foreign country 
with no viable option to come to their home country or 
be relocated into a new country as ‘protracted refugee 
situations’. In 2004, UNHCR defined protracted refugee 
situations as a condition “in which refugees find 
themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of 
limbo.” UNHCR set a specific perimeter of “populations 
of 25,000 persons or more who have been in exile for five 
years in developing countries (UNHCR, 2004). Such 
classification received criticisms for its impracticality. It 
tends to overlook the complexity of the refugee issues 
since there are fewer refugees in numbers but have been 
living in exile for longer than five years. Moreover, the 
quantitative limit that UNHCR formulated was also 
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deemed problematic since collecting refugee statistics 
itself is correspondingly a challenging task (Milner, 
2014). Therefore, in 2009 UNHCR dropped the 
threshold of 25,000 persons and clarified the definition 
of protracted refugee situations as the case where refugees 
confined “for five years or more after their initial 
displacement, without immediate prospects for 
implementation of durable solutions” (UNHCR, 2009). 
Living in limbo, whether in refugee campsites or urban 
refugee housings, is never easy. Some may have spent 
their lives in the asylum country because returning to 
their home country can put them in danger. 
Furthermore, even if they are no longer living in peril, 
protracted refugees find it hard to be independent and 
self-sufficient as they tend to be dependent upon the help 
of humanitarian groups to provide them with their basic 
needs (UNHCR, 2004). 
    According to UNHCR, in 2019, 16 million people 
lived in a protracted refugee situation. Among the ten 
largest protracted refugees are the Afghans, Syrians, 
South Sudanese, Rohingyas, and the Somalis.  It is said 
that this figure is “a 12 percent increase” from 2018, and 
it “represents approximately 78 percent of all the refugees 
displaced worldwide” (UNHCR, 2020b). If we added 
that statistic with the number of Palestinian refugees 
administered under the UN Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA), the sum of 
protracted refugees in the world could reach more than 
20 million people (see United Nations, 2018). 
      Many factors arguably contribute to the prolongation 
of refugees’ stay in asylum countries. Lui (2007) argues 
the nature of the international system, very state-centric, 
is one factor causing the abandonment of the people 
refuging in other countries. She provided an example 
where the minimum attention given to the refugee crisis 
in Asia was caused by the lack of regional and national 
mechanisms to deal with the problem. Others have 
looked more into the national level of analysis. UNHCR, 
for example, stated that the origin of protracted refugees 
situations was political deadlock from the home country 
and the asylum country (UNHCR, 2004, pp. 1-2): 
   Long (2011) further explains the domestic politics 
factor driving people to move out from their countries. 
She argues that the displacement of people into another 
country where their stays can expand to more than 
decades is related to the state’s absence in addressing the 
social problems in its country. Over time these social 
problems, such as poverty and insecurity, transform into 
violent conflicts, triggering the exodus of people seeking 
refuge in another country. Long points out the case of 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan since the political crisis 
in Afghanistan, which then led to the Soviet invasion in 
1979, as an example of a failed state contributing to 
protracted refugees. However, the state’s failure in 
providing its people’s needs is not the only problem. 
People also migrated from their country because of the 
suppression imposed by their authoritarian government. 
A notable example of this case is the flight of Rohingyas 
to Myanmar’s neighboring countries in Southeast Asia 
originating from the systematic state discrimination and 
violence. In addition to problems deriving from the 
origin country, Long also argues that the inadequate 
migration policy to support refugees and the 
politicization of resettlement of the refugees contribute 
to the prolongation of refugees in the asylum countries. 
As pointed out by Long: 
Protracted refugee situations stem from political 
impasses. They are not inevitable but are rather the 
result of political action and inaction, both in the 
country of origin (the persecution or violence that led 
to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure 
because of ongoing problems in the countries of 
origin and stagnate and become protracted as a result 
of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving 
restrictions on refugee movement and employment 
possibilities, and confinement to camps.
States should move to accept refugees for resettlement 
on the basis of protection needs alone while at the 
same time exploring opportunities to open up other 
regular migration routes to suitably qualified refugee 
candidates. UNHCR should seek to expand 
opportunities for recognized refugees to travel and 
seek work using Convention travel documents (p.21).
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RESEARCH METHOD
       This research used the qualitative case study approach 
as we intended to grasp particular events and to narrate 
“key aspects of the case” (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, p. 
10). We applied the purposive sampling technique in 
selecting groups of respondents. Besides the refugees, the 
rest of the respondents approached were people who had 
direct interaction with them or involved in the 
implementation of refugees policy. Thus, we grouped 
four categories of respondents and interviewed 28 of 
them. The details of respondent groups as follows: 1) the 
government (six respondents from the City Council of 
Pekanbaru, two from the Immigration Office of 
Pekanbaru, and one from the local people’s 
representative council--DPRD); 2) refugees (twelve 
respondents); 3) the local community from local NGOs 
to community leaders (five respondents); international 
organizations (IOM and UNHCR) (two respondents). 
We gave each respondent open-ended questions based on 
their role and experience as or with refugees. We planned 
to have an equal gender-based sample from refugees. 
However, due to the sensitive subject matter, most of our 
prospective female respondents from the refugees group 
declined to be interviewed. The delicate subject of 
refugees also caused some of our respondents opted to be 
anonymous. In addition to the primary data, we also 
relied on information from the government websites (e.g. 
the City Council of Pekanbaru and the Cabinet 
Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia) to retrieve 
official documents or press releases; the local and 
national media that reported news on refugees in 
Indonesia; and other references such as academic 
publications or documents from organizations, like 
UNHCR, that involved in providing assisting the 
refugees. Phases for data analysis included data 
disassembling, interpreting, and concluding (see Yin, 
2010). We sorted the data that highlighted the refugees 
problems in Indonesia and corroborated the findings 
with information we received from the interviews with 
the respondents to see whether the problem had been 
properly addressed.
    As each argument has its strengths and weaknesses, 
what they have shown us is how complicated the refugee 
problem is and how each of the causes is interrelated. 
The failed state argument, for example, cannot be 
separated from how other states respond to the 
neighbor’s crisis either through offering assistance 
bilaterally or the regional organization mechanism. Thus, 
if one has to find a solution for the refugee crisis, one 
must also address the multilevel challenges involving all 
the stakeholders, from states to the refugees themselves.
157
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
REVITALIZING THE LOCAL INTEGRATION
APPROACH
     Local integration, as previously mentioned, is one of 
the solutions that UNHCR suggested to break the 
dilemma of protracted refugees situations. The other two 
solutions are voluntary repatriation and resettlement. 
Repatriation is defined as a circumstance when refugees 
decided to return to their home country, and thus, their 
citizenship rights got restored. Resettlement is “the 
selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which 
they have sought protection to a third state that has 
agreed to admit them—as refugees—with permanent 
residence status” (UNHCR, 2020a). After the Cold War 
ended, refugee politics have changed how states perceived 
refugees and the UNHCR suggested solutions (Jacobsen, 
2001). Local integration was once a widely chosen 
practice during the Cold War, especially among Western 
countries. States offered permanent asylum to refugees 
and encouraged them to integrate with society. While 
developing countries rarely granted permanent residency 
or took the local integration option, they let refugees 
come into their territory to resettle next to the locals. This 
hospitality mode has changed after the Cold War ended, 
especially since people started to securitize the refugee 
issue. Fueled by xenophobia, refugees are seen as 
liabilities, associated with criminal activities, and 
regarded as a security threat (see Hovil, 2014; Jacobsen, 
2001). Consequently, the government has a growing 
tendency to adopt a protectionist approach and ignore 
the “free integration” idea when dealing with the refugee 
crisis (Hovil, 2014, p. 491). Developing countries are said 
to follow the unwillingness of the developed countries to 
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adopt the local integration approach. Only a small 
number of countries employed the local integration 
option (see Fielden, 2008), while some others treated 
refugees as prima facie refugees that eliminated their 
rights written in the 1951 Convention. Self-settlement, a 
popular approach for developing countries during the 
Cold War, has also become less practiced. 
    We support Jacobsen’s argument on the need to 
revive the local integration option because informal 
integration (e.g., social acceptance by the locals) has 
already taken place even when the government does not 
support the formal integration (i.e., obtaining citizenship) 
of refugees. According to Jacobsen, such a process is likely 
to happen if refugees are not kept in camps, live free from 
threat, access public facilities, and socialize with the locals 
(Jacobsen, 2001). The argument for local integration 
certainly raises a question on how to support or execute 
the plan? Jacobsen underlines two prerequisites necessary 
in revitalizing local integration. First, refugees, the local 
community, and the host government must come to 
terms with local integration feasibility. It means that they 
must clarify these concerns: under what circumstance 
that local integration practical? and what are “the needs 
and concerns” (p.4) of the stakeholders? Second, 
Jacobsen mentions that repatriation must be included in 
the local integration program. Freedom of movement 
from host countries to origin countries is what 
characterizes protracted situations, and “incorporating 
return migration into a policy of local integration will 
make it more acceptable to both refugees and host 
countries” (p.5).  As Jacobsen points out, there is a 
misconception held by many that refugees who went 
through a local integration program will not return to 
their home countries. However, studies have shown a 
contrary result, since refugees tend to choose to repatriate 
as normalcy and stability return to their countries (see 
Bahar, Özgüzel, Hauptmann, & Rapoport, 2019; Fresia, 
2014; Weima, 2017).
       Jacobsen lays out six key groups (stakeholders) whose 
interests will determine the success of the local 
integration: UNHCR, NGOs, the host government, the 
local population, donors, and the refugees. As she stated: 
“Local integration depends on the goodwill of key groups 
in the host country. In the absence of this goodwill, 
refugees will find it more difficult to settle amongst the 
community and become integrated” (p.10). Thus, what 
should be done first, is to study “the full range of 
interests” (p. 10) of each stakeholder to review the 
possible complications that might hinder the integration 
process whether the concerns of security, burden sharing 
on economic resources, or cultural differences. Jacobsen 
underlines the importance of facilitating the refugees to 
become self-sufficient through imposing freedom of 
movement and contributing to the locals’ economy and 
growth. It is achievable if the government clarifies the 
legal status of the refugees to reside and move freely and 
that the government and UNHCR produce assistance 
programs that can benefit the refugees as well as the 
locals.
     While Jacobsen emphasizes the role of institutions, 
the government and organizations like UNHCR, another 
significant factor that should not be overlooked is the 
role of refugees themselves. The concern of what kind of 
needs they want and how they will negotiate that needs 
with local actors is vital if we regard socio-economic 
integration as “the best solution” to have their basic rights 
(Polzer, 2009, p. 97). In regards to local integration 
policies, best practice conducted by several countries like 
Morocco, Belarus, and Brazil, show a wide range of 
solutions offered to the refugees, from housing, 
vocational and language training, access to educational 
institutions, to employment support (Moreira & 
Baeninger, 2010; UNHCR, 2015). Some cases also 
feature civil society organizations and religious 
institutions, such as churches, in empowering refugees. 
These programs are not without problems. As the case in 
Brazil shows, challenges to local integration, such as the 
lack of employment and discrimination, remains 
(Moreira & Baeninger, 2010). 
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LIVING IN LEGAL LIMBO IN INDONESIA
    According to UNHCR Indonesia (2020), as of July 
2020, there were 13,653 foreigners registered as refugees 
and asylum seekers in Indonesia. Most of them come 
from Afghanistan (56%), Somalia (10%), Iraq (6%), and 
around 643 (4.7%) of refugees are without states—the 
statistic of the stateless refugees in Indonesia might be 
higher than UNHCR’s estimation. If we compare 
Indonesia to other Asian countries that also host refugees 
in their territories, Indonesia looks after a considerably 
lower number of refugees. Indonesia is far behind 
Bangladesh that hosts more than 860,000 refugees, and 
even with its neighbor Malaysia that manages 177,000 
refugees. These refugees see Indonesia as a transit country 
where UNHCR then refer them to other countries like 
Australia or New Zealand. They came to Indonesia using 
different modes of transportation—by boats and planes; 
methods—illegally or legally through tourist visa; and 
causes—running away from prosecution or victims of 
human smuggling (Susetyo, 2020).
       Indonesia is not a signatory party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and, thus, it has relieved the country from 
the responsibility to grant refugees their rights as stated in 
the treaty. Despite this circumstance, Indonesia has 
continued to accept the arrival of refugees based on 
humanity and the fact that repulsing them contradicts 
the non-refoulment principle stipulated under 
Indonesia’s laws on human rights. The legal loophole 
implies that refugees who seek refuge in Indonesia only 
have limited choices. They cannot travel freely or look for 
employment to support their lives (Missbach, 2017). For 
asylum seekers who come to UNHCR to obtain refugee 
status, their lives depend on UNHCR and IOM’s 
assistance—these international organizations themselves 
rely on donors’ contributions. In addition to the 
UNHCR and IOM administered refugees, there are 
approximately 5000 self-funded refugees (pengungsi 
mandiri), which, as the name implies, rely on themselves 
to live in Indonesia (Pudjiastuti, 2020). Unfortunately for 
these refugees, the future is looking grim. As third 
countries such as Australia or the United States imposed 
stricter refugee policy, the chance for getting resettlement 
in third countries has become slim. In 2019, there were 
A VIEW FROM PEKANBARU
    According to UNHCR Indonesia (2020), as of July 
2020, there were 13,653 foreigners registered as refugees 
and asylum seekers in Indonesia. Most of them come 
from Afghanistan (56%), Somalia (10%), Iraq (6%), and 
around 643 (4.7%) of refugees are without states—the 
statistic of the stateless refugees in Indonesia might be 
higher than UNHCR’s estimation. If we compare 
Indonesia to other Asian countries that also host refugees 
in their territories, Indonesia looks after a considerably 
lower number of refugees. Indonesia is far behind 
Bangladesh that hosts more than 860,000 refugees, and 
even with its neighbor Malaysia that manages 177,000 
refugees. These refugees see Indonesia as a transit country 
where UNHCR then refer them to other countries like 
Australia or New Zealand. They came to Indonesia using 
different modes of transportation—by boats and planes; 
methods—illegally or legally through tourist visa; and 
causes—running away from prosecution or victims of 
human smuggling (Susetyo, 2020).
      Pekanbaru is one of five cities in Indonesia alongside 
Jakarta, Medan, Makasar, and Tanjung Pinang, where 
UNHCR representatives operate. Besides UNHCR, 
Pekanbaru is also where IOM places one of its 
representative offices to administer the refugees. Based 
on the data from Rumah Detensi Imigrasi Pekanbaru 
(2020), there were currently 984 refugees live in 
Pekanbaru per July 2020; most of them are from 
Afghanistan (827), followed by Myanmar (34) and Sudan 
(30). Other countries of origin are Pakistan, Somalia, 
Palestine, Iraq and Iran. Unlike other big cities, such as 
Jakarta, Medan, or Makasar, Pekanbaru hosts a relatively 
small number of refugees. Most of them are managed by 
only 720 refugees from Indonesia relocated to third 
countries through resettlement or sponsor programs 
(UNHCR Indonesia, 2020). This small figure has only 
projected what living in legal limbo is, especially for those 
who have spent more than five years in Indonesia with 
uncertainty ahead of them (Liputan 6, 2019). If this trend 
continues to happen, the number of protracted refugees 
in Indonesia will grow, and Indonesia will have to deal 
with more complicated problems.  
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UNHCR and IOM in Pekanbaru—only one family chose 
to be self-reliant. Again, this condition is different from 
other Indonesian cities, where the number of 
independent and unregistered refugees is abundant.
    Most of the refugees we interviewed have spent 4-8 
years living in Pekanbaru, which means that they have 
met the category of protracted refugee situations defined 
by UNHCR. Some were relocated to Pekanbaru from 
other cities in Indonesia (e.g., Bogor), while others chose 
Pekanbaru as their first entrance to Indonesia. They have 
different employment backgrounds, from professional to 
low-income jobs. Some came to Indonesia from their 
home country using Indonesia’s lax visa policy, and 
others went through such hardship, trafficked by 
smugglers from country to country. A respondent from 
Afghanistan (Rahim, 2020) took three months to get 
from Afghanistan to Indonesia by taking land and sea 
routes, while a respondent from Myanmar described his 
journey as a painful experience as the boat he took to 
Indonesia stranded at sea (Malik, 2020).
  They live in a community shelter that IOM 
provided—there are eight community houses spread 
across Pekanbaru. Since they live close to the local 
community, the interaction between them and the 
neighborhood people is anticipated. Refugees told us 
that they have adjusted and participated in local norms 
and practices, such as gotong royong, religious sermons 
and celebrations, or vaccination at the local health post 
(Posyandu). While the general attitude of the locals is 
welcoming toward the refugees, some of the refugees 
admitted that they had bad experiences with the locals. 
One respondent recalled that he had to clarify the 
misinformation that led to the resentment of the local 
people to the refugees, which they thought only took 
advantage of the Indonesian government. “Indonesia 
welcomes us, support us… they are just driven by jealousy. 
I do not know where they get that information” (Madin, 
2020). Another way that refugees have taken to break the 
social barriers with the locals is learning Bahasa 
Indonesia. Some of the protracted refugees we met have 
mastered Bahasa Indonesia, either through self-study or 
direct communication with Indonesians who befriended 
them. One respondent told us that he regretted not 
paying enough attention to learning Bahasa Indonesia 
when coming to Indonesia because he thought his stay 
would be short, yet, he has been stuck living in Indonesia 
for eight years (Rahim, 2020).
    Refugees were satisfied that they could normally live 
side by side with the locals, not living in a detention 
house. However, they complained about the limitation 
imposed on them by the government, from scheduled 
hours of when they can go in and out of the community 
houses, prohibited from married while living in 
Indonesia, barred from traveling outside the city limit 
and admission to higher educational institutions. They 
are even not allowed to apply for a job even though the 
job is informal. Malik, who got caught by the 
Immigration Office for teaching Qur’an recitation to 
children in his neighborhood, had to spend some time in 
the detention house, an experience that traumatized him. 
On the issue of marriage, Rahim, as he pointed out to his 
fellow refugees of age 20-30, said: “I am the focal point [of 
the refugees] and know everything going on. Most 
refugees are singles, but they are not allowed to get 
married here. It is depressing.” Maheen (2020) wanted to 
pursue a higher degree: “We do not have permission to 
work and study. I hope the Indonesian government at 
least permits us to study if they do not want us to get a 
job. I want to go to university to pursue a Master’s degree, 
but unfortunately, we do not have that opportunity.”
     What we have seen from our interviews with refugees 
in Pekanbaru is relatively similar to elsewhere in 
Indonesia. They have to live a life where the future is 
uncertain, and they do not have other places to go but to 
wait in a country that limits their rights. Out of 
frustration, on August 9, 2019, a group of refugees held a 
protest in front of UNHCR and IOM’s representative 
offices in Pekanbaru, demanding the organizations to 
find a solution to their problems (Liputan 6, 2019). In 
responding to the event, the UNHCR’s representative 
that we interviewed pointed out that while it is the 
responsibility of UNHCR to assist refugees in applying 
for resettlement, the final word is not from them but the 
governments of the third countries (Syukri, 2020).
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PP. NO. 125 TAHUN 2016,
A GOOD SIGN BUT NOT ENOUGH
   On July 25, 2017, the Indonesian government 
adopted PP No. 125 Tahun 2016, a regulation that has 
become the legal basis for managing refugees in 
Indonesia. Seventeen years since the passing of Law No. 
37 (Undang Undang Nomor 37), stating the need for a 
follow-up policy that details the handling of refugees in 
1999, this law is certainly a long time coming. Previously, 
in the absence of an authorization policy to assist 
refugees, people arriving in the country to seek asylum 
were treated as illegal immigrants and held in detention 
houses by the Immigration Office until UNHCR granted 
their status as refugees (Utami, 2019).
      On the one hand, PP No. 125 Tahun 2016 is a positive 
sign regarding refugee protection in Indonesia. Despite 
being a non-signatory party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, Indonesia has taken the responsibility to 
assist refugees under a formal legal framework. It replaces 
the ad-hoc measures that were once overseen by the 
Immigration Office. Moreover, it reinforces the 
responsible agencies, which include “the Ministry of Law 
and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security, 
Directorate General of Immigration, as well as UNHCR 
and a handful of NGOs” (Prabandari & Adiputera, 2019, 
p. 141). The handling of refugees under PP No. 125 
Tahun 2016 also indicates an active role of local 
governments in handling refugees residing in their area. 
At the local government, one of the follow-ups of PP No. 
125 Tahun 2016 is the formation of a special task force 
consisting of the representatives from the local 
Immigration Office, the National and  Political Unity 
Agency (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik—Kesbangpol), 
and UNHCR. When we conducted this research, 
Pekanbaru’s task force for refugee assistance was at its 
earlier stage of operating. In our discussion with 
respondents from Kesbangpol and UNHCR, this task 
force aims to smooth coordination between members of 
the unit and serves as a communication channel to find a 
solution to refugee-related problems.
    On the other hand, PP No. 125 Tahun 2016 has 
barely moved the needle to improve the refugee situation 
in Indonesia. It only goes so far as to validate “existing 
practices” (Missbach et al., 2018, p. 20). Even before 
adopting the presidential regulation, the Immigration 
Office, as the government agency responsible for 
managing refugees, had to coordinate with other local 
government agencies such as Kesbangpol, the police, 
social services, governor and mayor offices, as well as 
UNHCR and IOM. Moreover, while the regional 
autonomy policy allows local governments to arrange 
their public spending, it does not mean that assistance to 
refugees is available or sustainable as it depends on the 
political will of the local governments. On the issue of 
providing the educational right, for example, the city of 
Pekanbaru has initiated to offer children refugees access 
to primary education. However, the city council admitted 
that they ran a limited budget; thus, these children did 
not get the same treatment as the local residents (Pemko 
Pekanbaru, 2019). Children refugees were only treated as 
fillers to meet a quota of students as public schools 
prioritize local students, which means not all of them 
could have the chance to go to school. The city council 
also insisted that the children refugees would only receive 
a statement letter, not an official transcript or a certificate 
from the school boards, regardless of its essential role for 
their future education. Our respondent from the Local 
People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah—DPRD) also brought up financial issues 
regarding the refugee situation in Pekanbaru. Since we 
conducted this research when the COVID-19 pandemic 
has significantly impacted the global economy, our 
respondent mentioned the limit that the city has to assist 
refugees as many lower-income families require 
government help.
     In addition to the deficiencies of PP No. 125 Tahun 
2016 that resulted in the budget availability and the 
commitment problems (see Missbach et al., 2018), what 
makes the rule problematic is it does not tell us the 
position of the Indonesian government concerning the 
protracted refugee situation in Indonesia. What is the 
solution for the people whose chances of resettling in a 
third country have become smaller every day and the 
Enabling refugees to become self-sufficient and part of 
the local community does not necessarily mean that 
governments should allocate land to refugees or give 
them special privileges… Freedom of movement (itself 
an enshrined right of refugees) means that refugees 
have the opportunity to become economically active 
and participate in the local economy, contributing to 
its growth rather than wasting their economic 
potential in camps (p. 23).
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option of returning to their home country will only 
jeopardize their lives? Although we do not doubt the 
significance of the discussion of whether or not Indonesia 
should ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, we believe it 
will only move us away from the main problem of 
refugees stranded in the country.
    PP No. 125 Tahun 2016, albeit its slow development 
and weaknesses, has demonstrated that Indonesia is 
willing to respond to the changing environment. Thus, 
why not start making changes that lead to the 
improvement of refugees in Indonesia? The local 
integration framework developed by Jacobsen (2001) is 
one of the viable solutions to protracted refugee 
situations. It is important to note here, the local 
integration does not automatically imply the 
naturalization of the refugees. It can take various shapes 
and forms as long as all stakeholders, from the national 
and local governments, UNHCR, local communities to 
refugees, agree on the type of integration plan they want 
to pursue. One of the integration steps highlighted by 
Jacobsen is the need to ease the economic restriction to 
the refugees:
  In the Indonesian context, several studies have 
suggested that economic empowerment for refugees is 
workable because the number of refugees in Indonesia is 
smaller than the total workforce in the country. Adiputera 
and Prabandari (2018) argue that employments will be 
beneficial not only to the refugees but also to the host 
country as refugees might take an active role in creating 
job opportunities. While Locastro, Alfath & Hu (2019) 
suggest the government and supporting organizations to 
encourage refugees to take internships, entrepreneurship, 
vocational programs, access to education from primary to 
tertiary levels, and language training. These are similar 
programs practiced to empower refugees in other 
countries (see Jabbar & Zaza, 2016; Smith et al., 2019).  
We want to emphasize the vital role of social integration 
in supporting economic empowerment programs. The 
social aspect of local integration is quite a challenge 
mainly because not all stakeholders have the complexity 
of refugee issues. Thus, it requires coordinated work 
from the government, NGOs, and international 
organizations to address the social distrust, racial and 
religious discrimination, and other social problems from 
local integration.
CONCLUSION
      The adoption of PP No. 125 Tahun 2016, regarded as 
an essential milestone to Indonesia’s approach to 
handling refugees in Indonesia, has left a question on 
how to deal with protracted refugees? This paper has 
suggested the government to consider the option of local 
integration. Local integration does not mean the 
obligation to grant citizenship for the refugee but to allow 
them basic rights, such as employment access. This study 
provides an insight into how PP No. 125 Tahun 2016 has 
missed the main problem with refugees. Many refugees 
have been stuck in Indonesia for many years with little 
possibility of returning to their home country and getting 
resettlement in a third country. Restricting their 
movements have only put more burden on them, 
especially for those coming with their families. Providing 
them leeway to be self-reliant and let them integrate with 
the local community are viable solutions. As suggested in 
the discussion, the local integration program does not 
solely rest on the government’s shoulder. All stakeholders, 
from the government, local community, supporting 
organizations, and the refugees, should be involved in 
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